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S E N T E N C I N G L AW
Is Supervised Release Tolled Retrospective to the Start of an
Unrelated Detention If the Defendant Is Credited with Time Served
Upon Sentencing for the New Offense?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The district court sentenced Jason Mont for violating his supervised release conditions after a state
conviction and sentence that credited him for time in pretrial detention served while he was on supervised
release. Mont challenges the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) does not
permit the court to reach backward to find that supervised release was tolled once he received credit
for his pretrial detention at sentencing. Petitioner and respondent disagree about the interpretation of
the language and structure of Section 3624(e). While the government relies heavily on the purpose of
supervised release, petitioner notes that the district court could have prevented its jurisdiction from
lapsing had it issued a summons or warrant prior to the end of his supervised release, as indicated in 18
U.S.C. § 3583(i). Such summons or warrant would have allowed the court to hold the violations hearing
even after supervised release ended.

Mont v. United States
Docket No. 17-8995
Argument Date: February 26, 2019
From: The Sixth Circuit
by Nora V. Demleitner
Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA

INTRODUCTION
Federal courts impose supervised release upon a prison sentence
in almost all cases.1 In this case, the Court is asked to interpret
one sentence in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) to determine when a term of
supervised release might be paused.

ISSUES
Does 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) toll a period of supervised release
while petitioner is held in pretrial custody awaiting trial on a
state offense when the time in detention is later credited to his
sentence?

FACTS
In 2005, Jason Mont was sentenced to ten years in federal prison
after being convicted on drug charges. Subsequent sentence
reductions led to his release on March 6, 2012, when his ive-year
supervised release started. Almost four years into his supervised
release term, in January 2016, Mont’s probation oficer informed
the district court that Mont had violated his release conditions
by testing positive for drugs and attempting to replace his urine
sample with another liquid. In addition, state drug charges had
been iled against him. On June 1, 2016, state authorities arrested

Mont for cocaine traficking. He was held pretrial at a local jail.
On October 6, 2016, he pled guilty to state charges in exchange
for a six-year prison sentence. Mont conceded that in light of his
state conviction, he had violated his supervised release conditions
and requested a hearing. The district court judge wanted to hold
the violation hearing after the state sentencing, which delayed it
for months. The court indicated later that it issued a summons in
November 2016, in conjunction with a then-planned hearing on
the supervised release.
The state court sentenced Mont to the agreed-upon six-year term
on March 21, 2017, and credited the entire presentence time
to that sentence. On March 30, 2017, the federal court issued a
warrant for Mont. The hearing on the supervised release violation
inally occurred on June 28, 2017. At that point Mont argued that
the court lacked jurisdiction because the supervision period
had expired on March 6, 2017. The district court summarily
rejected the argument. According to the district court, under 18
U.S.C. § 3583(i), its November summons allowed it to retain the
power to sanction Mont for the supervised release violation even
though the term had expired. It then sentenced him to 42 months
imprisonment, to be served consecutive to his state sentence.

1. In FY 2017, 94 percent of all nonimmigration cases in which the offender was sentenced to imprisonment included supervised release. U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases, Fiscal Year 2017 (June 2018), at 6, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-publications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf.
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

21

The Sixth Circuit afirmed in an unpublished opinion, available
in the Joint Appendix, though on different grounds as it could not
ind any documentation on the record that the summons was ever
issued. It relied on a circuit precedent, U.S. v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 847 (2008), inding that under 18
U.S.C. § 3624(e) supervised release paused when the defendant
was incarcerated based on an indictment that resulted in a
conviction and the subsequent sentence credited the defendant
with time served. Therefore, the court had jurisdiction over the
defendant when it issued the warrant on March 30, 2017, and at
the time of the hearing, even without resorting to Section 3583(i).
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari on
November 2, 2018.

CASE ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is the interpretation of one sentence in
a supervised release provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Section
3624 is entitled “Release of a prisoner”; subsection (e) is called
“Supervision after release.” The sentence at issue notes that
“[a] term of supervised release does not run during any period in
which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction
for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is
for a period of less than 30 consecutive days” (emphasis added).
Appellate courts to consider the issue have split on the question
whether detention tolls supervised release if the supervisee is
later convicted and sentenced, with credit given for the time in
custody. Two federal courts—United States v. Marsh, 829 F.3d 705
(D.C. Cir. 2016), and United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102
(9th Cir. 1999)—have not allowed for such a backward-looking
tolling while four others—Goins, United States v. Ide, 624 F.3d 666
(4th Cir. 2010), United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir.
2009), United States v. Molina-Gazca, 571 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2009)—
have found supervised release to pause under such circumstances
during pretrial detention.
Petitioner Mont argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
revoke his supervised release because its term had already ended
at the time of the revocation hearing. Since the record does not
relect that the district court issued a summons, Section 3583(i)
is inapplicable. That provision, entitled “Delayed revocation,”
extends the court’s power to revoke supervised release and
sentence the offender for any violation of a condition of the
release “beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release
for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters
arising before its expiration, if before its expiration, a warrant or
summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a
violation.” Petitioner concedes that had the summons been issued
in November 2016, the district court would have had jurisdiction to
revoke his supervised release and sentence him accordingly.
Section 3624(e), on the other hand, does not extend the court’s
jurisdiction in light of the language, structure, and legislative
history of the provision. According to petitioner, the appellate
court’s “backlip,” therefore, inappropriately tolled supervised
release during pretrial detention when the defendant is later
credited with time served at sentencing. Petitioner relies on
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000), in which the
Supreme Court interpreted Section 3624(e) in a strictly temporal
manner. Even though Roy Lee Johnson served an excessively
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long sentence, the Court held that under the statute supervised
release follows upon imprisonment, rather than some “ictitious or
constructive earlier time.” Yet, the Sixth Circuit in Goins restricted
the Johnson approach to one sentence in Section 3624(e) and
otherwise adopted the backward-looking tolling approach. It did so
even though the present tense used throughout the statute further
supports a linear interpretation. The D.C. Circuit in United States
v. Marsh, 829 F.3d 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016), focused on the word is
whose present tense removes the possibility of a backward-looking
method of statutory tolling. After all, the Marsh court found the
present tense to include the future but not the past.
Petitioner also cites rules of statutory interpretation, when applied
to the terms in the statute, in support of his argument. Section
3624(e)’s use of the term imprisonment indicates that Congress
contemplated imprisonment upon conviction rather than pretrial
detention, even if later credited to a prison term. In this argument,
petitioner inds support in United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d
1102 (9th Cir. 1999). The phrase in connection with also prevents
the application presented, despite the inding in Goins that pretrial
detention is connected to a conviction when it is later credited to the
sentence. Petitioner, on the other hand, deems the term connected
solely to imprisonment for a supervised release violation.
Petitioner sees a structural distinction between the court’s power
to revoke supervised release and sentence the offender for any
violation of a condition of the release between Section 3583 and
Section 3624. He views Section 3583(i) as governing the court and
providing it with the power to extend jurisdiction while Section
3624(e) is a directive to the Bureau of Prisons, instructing it
how to calculate supervised release. The district court could have
easily established jurisdiction had it issued a summons or warrant
prior to March 6, 2017. It is, therefore, unnecessary to strain the
interpretation of Section 3624(e) when a judge could extend the
time for revoking supervised release under Section 3583(i) by
issuing a summons or warrant. The advantage of this approach
would be to provide notice and assure certainty.
In its reply, the government focuses extensively on the purpose of
supervised release and the impact of detention on these goals. It
argues that starting June 1, 2016, Mont’s detention interfered with
his liberty and ended his transition into the community. Since the
probation oficer could no longer effectively exercise supervision,
supervised release terminated at that point. The government
concedes that even if that interruption was not apparent on June
1, it became obvious in October when Mont pled guilty to the state
charges. The supervised release tolls no later than when the state
court accepted the guilty plea. As the term conviction covers both
the inding of guilt as well as the entry of a inal judgment, with
the former, custody changes from pretrial detention to being a
component of the penalty.
The purposes of supervised release further support this analysis.
The government notes that lengthy incarceration during
supervised release after all ends the transition into the community
as it renders voluntary and afirmative compliance with the
terms of supervised release impossible and thwarts meaningful
supervision. That will be the case whether the sentence is served
before or after a conviction. Either way the prison term interrupts
the supervised release. The offender should not be credited for
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supervised release time while he is in prison. The government
notes prohibition against such double counting is relected in
other statutes.

here asserted it had done. In light of that factual question, which the
Sixth Circuit resolved against the district court, the government is
asking for a remand should the Supreme Court ind for Mont.

The government also inds petitioner’s language-based arguments
unconvincing. First, the phrase in connection with a conviction
in Section 3624(e) is to be read broadly and is not restricted to
imprisonment that occurs “after” a conviction but rather applies
to any imprisonment related to a conviction. After all, any time a
custodial term is credited against post-conviction imprisonment,
it would be considered in connection with that conviction. Since
the state court credited Mont with the time he served in pretrial
detention, that incarcerative period would retrospectively be
deemed imprisonment in connection with a conviction.

The government’s brief, as one would expect, is well written and
cogently argued, but one wonders about the extensive discussion
of the purpose of supervised release in what seems like a question
of statutory construction. Most persuasive may be petitioner’s
structural argument. Section 3624 seems to focus on the Bureau
of Prisons rather than federal courts while Section 3583 directly
addresses the district court, empowering it to adjudicate violations
after expiration of the supervised release as long as it issued a
warrant or summons during the supervised release period. In the
end, a victory for Mont would allow him to be released after his
six-year state sentence without having to return to federal prison.
It would vindicate the D.C. and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation and
likely head off other questions such as how to address lengthy
pretrial detention that interrupts supervised release but is
ultimately not credited to a future sentence. Yet, systemically, little
change is likely except that some district courts may come to issue
a summons or warrant more proactively, with probation oficers
watching the clock even more closely.

Second, use of the present tense in Section 3624(e) does not
invalidate this interpretation. The tolling provision applies to
imprisonment either when it begins or when its connection to a
conviction becomes obvious. Third, as the federal code frequently
uses the term imprisonment to denote any form of custody or
detention, including pretrial detention, the government argues
there is no reason to construe it narrowly here. The term does not
apply only to post-sentence custody.
The government concludes that the district court had authority
to sentence Mont for violation of the conditions of his supervised
release because either his pretrial or, at a minimum, his post-plea
incarceration tolled the term of his supervised release.

SIGNIFICANCE
In 2015, Mont was one of about 115,000 federal offenders on
supervised release, who served an average time of almost three
years under supervision.2 Mont’s failure to complete his term
successfully is, unfortunately, not unusual, as the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s data indicate. Of federal inmates released into the
community in 2005, half were rearrested, a third reconvicted, and
a quarter re-incarcerated within eight years. Among the most
common serious new offenses was drug traficking.3 Even though
many of the new offenses occur shortly after release, not all of
them do. Mont, in fact, stayed out of trouble longer than many
of those who reoffend. New offenses and technical violations of
supervised release may both lead to the revocation of supervised
release. According to the Sentencing Commission, about a third
of those under supervision end up having their terms revoked and
are being sent back to prison.4
Yet, only half the circuits have confronted the question at issue
here, whether to apply Section 3624(e) in a backward-looking
way to toll supervised release. That may indicate the limited
practical applicability of the issue. Perhaps it is that the timeline,
which created part of the challenge in Mont, does not occur overly
frequently. Perhaps federal judges are inclined to issue a summons
or warrant while supervised release is running, as the district court

Besides Mont, the Court has another supervised release case on
its argument schedule for February 26. United States v. Haymond
(Docket No. 17-8995) addresses the constitutionality of a federal
law that mandates a ive-year prison term for sex offenders who
violate the terms of their supervised release. That case, which has
attracted substantially more attention than Mont and has garnered
a number of amicus briefs, raises Sixth Amendment questions in
the context of a sentence revocation. The stakes are substantially
higher than in Mont, and the question arises whether the Court
plans to take on supervised release more systematically, especially
as Mont was an unpublished opinion, with an at least ambiguous
factual issue that could have resolved the question at issue.
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